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Oven: Evidence - A Practitioner's Guide to Statements of Fault and the

EVIDENCE-A Practitioner's Guide to Statements of Fault and the
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Exception to the Hearsay Rule. Blake
v. State, 933 P.2d 474 (Wyo. 1997).

INTRODUCTION

Following a report of alleged sexual abuse, an agent of the Wyoming
Department of Family Services, accompanied by an officer of the sheriff's
department, interviewed a sixteen year old girl at her high school.' As required by Wyoming law, the officer transported the victim to a local hospital for a medical examination.2 Dr. Mary Bowers examined the victim in
compliance with the guidelines found in a Wyoming sexual assault evidence
kit.' During the medical examination the victim provided the identity of her
assailant to Dr. Bowers.'
Later that day, the sheriff's office interviewed the victim's stepfather
David Alfred Blake.' David Blake confessed to having sexual intercourse
with the victim over a three to four year period.' The sheriff's office then
placed Blake under arrest.!
At trial, the state prosecutor relied primarily on Blake's typed confession, testimony by the Department of Family Services investigator, testimony by the officer who interviewed the victim, testimony by the police
officer who interviewed and obtained the confession from Blake, testimony
of the nurse who assisted Dr. Bowers in the medical examination, and Dr.
Bowers' testimony. Over objections by defense counsel, Dr. Mary Bowers'
testimony included the victim's statements identifying David Blake as her
assailant.' Neither Blake nor the State prosecutor called the victim to the
stand.' The jury found Blake guilty of two counts of second degree sexual

1. Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 476 (Wyo. 1997).
2. Id. Medical examination of potential sexual abuse victims is mandatory pursuant to Wyoming
law. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-309 (Michie 1997). Section 6-2-309 reads in part:
Promptly after receiving a report of any alleged sexual assault of the first, second or third
degree, the peace officer to whom the incident is reported shall take the victim to a licensed
physician for examination, unless the victim refuses the examination. If a licensed physician is
unavailable, the medical examination may be made by a person qualified to conduct the
examination.
Id.
3. Blake, 933 P.2d at 479.
4. Id.
5. Id. at476.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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assault. 0
On appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, Blake argued that the testimony of Dr. Bowers should have been excluded as hearsay. The Wyoming
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that although the testimony of Dr. Bowers concerning the identity of the victim's abuser was in fact hearsay, it fell
under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception of both the Wyoming
and Federal Rules of Evidence."
The object of this case note is twofold: first, to construct a post-Blake
practitioners' guide to the Wyoming Supreme Court's views on the admissibility of statements of fault under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803(4); and second, to advocate that
trial judges give closer scrutiny to each statement sought to be admitted
under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803(4).
BACKGROUND

Wyoming Rule of Evidence 801(c) describes hearsay as "a statement
other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.""
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803 lists twenty-four exceptions to the general
exclusion of hearsay evidence." Of importance to Blake v. State" is subsection 4 which creates an exception for information given during the course of
medical examination or treatment."
In the seminal Wyoming case Goldade v. State," evidence presented at
trial included hearsay testimony as to the identity of the perpetrator. 7 In
Goldade, a nurse and physician examined a four-year-old suspected victim
of child abuse."8 During the examination, the victim informed both the nurse
and the attending physician of the identity of her assailant." Even though
10. Id.
at 479.
11. Id.
12. Wyo. R. EVID. 801(c).
13. WYo. R. Evim. 802 reads: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute." Id.
14. 933 P.2d at 474.
15. WYO. R. EVID. 803(4) reads:
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character
of the cause or external source therefore insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment
Id.
16. 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983).
17. Id. at 724.
at 723-24.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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the victim was unable to testify due to shyness," both the physician and the
nurse gave hearsay testimony identifying the victim's mother as the assailant."'

In Goldade, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the identity testimony was admissible, even though earlier in the opinion the court had conceded that it found
no quarrel with the general rule that statements attributing fault
usually are not admissible under rules identical to Rule 803(4) ....
If the goal of our court were simply to pursue the common-law tradition of stare decisis, then the... authorities must be recognized as
supporting the position of [inadmissibility]."
Policy reasons and the uniqueness of child abuse cases, however, fueled
support for departure." "In this instance... the function of the court must
be to pursue the transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious social
ailment which afflicts our society... child abuse." 4
The court insisted that the justification for the medical diagnosis or
treatment exception is the inherent reliability of statements made during the
course of examinations." "[A] fact reliable enough to serve as a basis for a
diagnosis is also reliable enough to escape hearsay proscription."' Furthermore, the court stressed that the identity of the assailant is needed by the
examining physician to help prevent the possibility of future danger."
In 1989, the Wyoming Supreme Court had the opportunity to apply the
reasoning of Goldade to a criminal sex act when Bill Stephens was convicted of taking immoral or indecent liberties with a child." The conviction
occurred after the victim's pediatrician testified and identified Bill Stephens
as the perpetrator. 9 The Stephens court agreed that statements attributing

20. The potential trauma that can be experienced by a child in testifying at trial is not without great
concern. Indeed, the well-being of the child must be evaluated in any determination as to the extent the
child is called to testify. Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?:
The Needfor a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years HearsayException Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207,
225 (1995). See also Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations,98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 818 (1985).
21. Goldade, 674 P.2d at 723.
22. Id. at 725.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 726.
26. Id. (citing DAVID W. LouISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 603
(1980)).
27. id.
28. Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wye. 1989).
29. Id. at 72.
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fault are in most circumstances excluded by the hearsay rule because they
are usually not relevant to the medical procedures of treatment or
diagnosis." However, the court stated that if it can be proven that the statements were in fact necessary for diagnosis or treatment of the patient, they
may be admitted." The court demonstrated that this standard is met by surviving the requirements of a two-prong test articulated in an Eighth Circuit
case, United States v. Renville." Even though the Stephens court found the
trial record insufficient to establish the proper foundation for 803(4) applithe use of the Renville test as a tool in Wyocability, it cited with approval
3
ming 803(4) analysis.
In UnitedStates v. Renville, Harvey Renville was convicted of sexually
abusing his eleven-year-old stepdaughter.Y At trial, the prosecution used
hearsay evidence, admitted under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception, to identify Renville as the assailant." The Renville court stated that the
crucial question in rule 803(4) applicability is whether the statement was
"reasonably pertinent" to diagnosis or treatment. The Renville court applied a two-prong test to determine whether the statements were a contributing aspect in the treatment or diagnosis of the patient.Y
The Renville court indicated that for the medical diagnosis or treatment
exception to be applicable, two requirements must be fulfilled. First, the
declarant's motive in making the statements had to be to promote actual
diagnosis or treatment. Second, the content of the statements had to be reasonably relied on by the physician in his or her duties, diagnosis, or treatment of the patient in question.'
Even though the Renville court agreed with the general rule that statements concerning identity are usually not required for medical diagnosis or

30. Id. (citing Horton v. State, 764 P.2d 674 (Wyo. 1988); Goldade, 674 P.2d at 721; United States
v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980)).
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985)).
33. Id. See Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474,478 (Wyo. 1997).
34. Renville, 779 F.2d at 43 1.
35. Id. at 435-36. The Federal medical diagnosis or treatment exception found in FED. R_ EvID.
803(4) is identical to the aforementioned WYO. R. EVID. Id.
36. Renville, 779 F.2d at 436.
37. Id. The Renville court cited to United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980). The Iron
Shell court formulated the two-part test as a means of determining if statements made to a physician
during diagnosis or treatment were inherently reliable. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84. That is, if the statements were in effect reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Id. However, it is the Renville court
that demonstrates the utility of this test in determining the validity of rule 803(4) to identification statements made in other sexual abuse cases. See Blake, 933 P.2d at 479; Bctzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010,
1017 (Wyo. 1993).
38. Renville, 779 F.2d at 436.
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treatment, it did carve an exception for sexual abuse cases." The court found
that sexual abuse cases pose two situations not common in many other
crimes. First, the physician must be attentive to treating the emotional and
psychological injuries of sexual abuse, a task aided immensely if the assailant's identity is known.' Second, the physician has an obligation to prevent
a child from being returned to an abusive situation, a determination that
cannot be made without knowing the abuser's identity.41
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Blake v. State, Blake argued that the statements concerning identity
were unnecessary for the diagnosis or treatment of the victim and therefore
did not correctly fall within the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to
the hearsay rule. 1 The court assaulted Blake's argument primarily on the
application of the two-part test' established in UnitedStates v. Renville.4
The Wyoming Supreme Court placed importance on Dr. Bowers' medical expertise in its analysis of the Renville test. The court found her actual
testimony at trial of considerable worth in making its determination as to
whether 803(4) was applicable:"1
Q. Do you recall what the first question was that you asked her?
A. I asked her the nature of the assault, what had transpired that
brought her to the emergency room.
Q. Okay. And why did you need to know that?
A. It was important for me to understand as a physician what her

39. Id. at 436-37.
40. Id. at 437.

41. Id. at 438.
42. Blake, 933 P.2d at 476. The opinion in Blake v. State also addressed whether the admission of
the testimony of Dr. Bowers violated David Blake's constitutional right to confront his accuser. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; WYO. CONST. art. 1,§ 10. In rejecting this argument, the Blake court made clear that
statements admitted pursuant to a firmly-rooted exception to the hearsay rule are sufficiently trustworthy
to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 479-80. This decision is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to confront "[F]irmly rooted exceptions [to the hearsay rule] carry sufficient
indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation Clause ....There
firmly rooted." White v. Illinois,
can be no doubt that the (medical diagnosis or treatment exception is]
502 U.S. 346, 356 n.8 (1992). By recognizing that firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause protect similar values, and that statements admitted pursuant to hearsay exceptions
pass constitutional muster, the rights of the accused with regard to hearsay evidence become largely
dependent on a proper application of the rules of evidence.
43. Blake, 933 P.2d at 478-79.
44. Renville, 779 F.2d at 430.

45. Blake, 933 P.2d at 478-79.
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emotional state was ....
Q. Was it important for your purposes of diagnosis or treatment?
A. It certainly is important. Who the alleged assailant might be in a
sexual assault determines frequently the extent to which testing and
treatment is given.
Q. In asking her that question, what did she say?
A. She told me that she had been subjected to sexual intercourse
forcibly by her stepfather numerous times over the previous several
years.1
The court accepted this information without evaluating the actual injuries
that occurred, nor did it question the actual usefulness of the information
concerning the identity of the perpetrator. 7 The court rejected Blake's claim
in two meaningful sentences:
The victim's statements were consistent with the purposes for
which Dr. Bowers became involved with the victim, that is, to perform tests and treat the victim as necessary. Dr. Bowers' testimony
indicates that she relied on the victim's account of the circumstances surrounding the sexual assault, including the abuser's identity, to determine how to properly treat the victim.18
Blake also asserted that the victim's age was an indication that the hearsay statement lacked sufficient reliability for 803(4) applicability.' The
court rejected this argument, stating simply that the child's age and personal
characteristics go toward the weight of the hearsay statement rather than its
admissibility.-'
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO WYOMING'S CURRENT TREATMENT OF
STATEMENTS OF FAULT AND THE MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT
EXCEPTION

The applicability of 803(4) to statements attributing fault and identity

46. Id. Questions given by the prosecuting attorney. Answers given by Dr. Mary Bowers. Id.
47. Id. at479.
48. Id.
49. Id. The victim in Blake was substantially older than victims of previous Wyoming cases allowing admissibility. See Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 192 (Wyo. 1995) (the victim was seven years old)
Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Wyo. 1993) (the victim was nine years old, but due to a mental
handicap had the mental capacity of a four-year-old); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 722 (Wyo. 1983)
(the victim was four years of age).
50. Blake, 933 P.2d at 479 (citing United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 100 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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can be viewed as having two parts: first, the testimony must meet judicially
created requirements of reliability; and second, the textual criteria of the
exception must be satisfied."
Judicially created concerns over the reliability of 803(4) fault state-

ments have manifested themselves in two major requirements. First, it appears that for the statements concerning identity to be admissible they must
be made by children. Second, the statements must be made within the context of medical diagnosis or treatment.
No Wyoming court has found that statements concerning identity are
admissible under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception as found in

Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803 if made by an adult accuser. Wyoming
courts have found children, in the context of medical diagnosis or treatment,
reliable enough to justify admission of statements even as damaging as
those concerning identity.5 1
Wyoming courts have found that children, suspected to be victims of
sexual and physical abuse, are less likely to fabricate an assault scenario
than victims having reached majority." Note however that this interpretation
is limited by the fact that a judicial comparison of adults and children is

lacking in Wyoming case law. This absence is entirely consistent with the
language of rule 803(4) itself, in that the text of the rule makes no mention
of age.w However, practitioners should note that even though the exception

51. The focus here will be primarily on Wyoming case law. Citations to the federal advisory committee notes concerning the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), which is identical to Wyoming
Rule of Evidence 803(4), is conspicuously missing in Wyoming case law. See Blake, 933 P.2d at 474;
Owen, 902 P.2d at 190; Bettle, 847 P.2d at 1010; Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989); Goldade,
674 P.2d at 721. It is noteworthy that a reference to the federal advisory committee is found in the dissent in Goldade: "Statements as to fault would not ordinarily qualify ... under this language. Thus a
patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that the car
was driven through a red-light." Goldade, 674 P.2d at 729 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. EVID.
803 advisory committee note).
52. Blake, 933 P.2d at 479; Owen, 902 P.2d at 195; Betzle, 847 P.2d at 1019; Stephens, 774 P.2d at
72; Goldade, 674 P.2d at 727.
53. Owen, 902 P.2d at 195 (citing Betzle, 847 P.2d at1020-1021). This factor is arguably ironic in
that children may be less aware of the negative effects that false statements have on diagnosis and treatment than adults. Marks, supranote 20; Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 952 (4th Cir. 1988) (Powell,
J., concurring and dissenting). Certainly children may be more intimidated by a physician and the medical procedure, but intimidation is not part of the normal formulation of the "trustworthiness rule." See
Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REv. 257, 266-81 (1989). See also Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132, 1135 n.7
(Colo. 1987) (stating that the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing that the child recognized the relevancy of his/her statements to the medical diagnosis or treatment); State v. Robinson, 735
P.2d 801, 809-10 (Ariz. 1987) (recognizing that children do not always understand the connection between truth and accurate statements). The court in Robinson found it relevant to look at the child's
statements, an evaluation of her sexual knowledge, and an evaluation of her child-like testimony to find
that the child did understand the relevancy of her statements to the medical exam. Id.
54. United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 100 (9th Cir. 1992).
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may apply to victims of all ages, statements as to identity have been limited
to child sexual and physical abuse cases." One reason is that the rationales
given to justify the admission of identity statements for medical diagnosis or
treatment are in many ways unique to children. For example, medical personnel often testify that the proper treatment of children includes a desire to
remove the child from the abusive setting," or to determine if the child was
emotionally damaged by threats to procure silence,"7 or to determine the
frequency of the abuse and therefore the extent to which medical treatment
and diagnosis is needed."' All of these procedures are in most circumstances
uniquely applicable to children."
The second judicially created concern for ensuring the reliability of the
medical diagnosis or treatment exception is that statements made identifying
the victim must be presented in a medical examination context. Courts that
have adopted the medical diagnosis or treatment exception almost universally insist that statements made facilitating medical diagnosis or treatment
are substantially motivated by a selfish interest to be treated correctly, or at
the very least, in a non-damaging way.' It is this selfish interest that creates
sufficient reliability to be admitted as an exception to the general hearsay
6

rule.

1

However, a demonstration of sufficient reliability, in and of itself, is
not enough for 803(4) admissibility. The text of 803(4) demands that the

exception apply to "statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history... insofar as reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment."'5 Therefore, for textual appropriateness, what
results is a two-part examination of the statements in question: First, was the
statement made for the "purpose" of medical diagnosis or treatment; second,

55. Mosteller, supra note 53, at 258; Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200, 205 (8th Cir. 1981). In
Roberts the alleged victim's adult status was a factor in a conclusion that evidence of proper motive and
trustworthiness were not sufficient to overturn a district court's ruling that the criteria of 803(4) had not
been met. Id.
56. Goldade, 674 P.2d at 726; United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430,438 (8th Cir. 1985).
57. United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1991).
58. Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474,479 (Wyo. 1997); Owen, 902 P.2d at 196.
59. JOHN E. B. MEYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 7.35 (2d ed. 1992).
60. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1980); Renville, 779 F.2d at 438;
Goldade, 674 P.2d at 725; Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 74 (Wyo. 1989); Bezl v. State, 847 P.2d
1010, 1020 (Wyo. 1993); Owen, 902 P.2d at 195.
61. But see United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 99-100 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that once a state-

ment is found admissible under the criteria of the exception, the court need not concem itself with
whether the child understands the need to be truthful); State v. Dever, 596 N.E.2d 436, 444 45 (Ohio
1992) (stating that selfish motivation is not the only assurance of reliability, physician reliance is an
indication of sufficient trustworthiness).
62. Wyo. R. EVID. 803(4).
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was it reasonably pertinent to that diagnosis or treatment.!
The hearsay statement must be made for the purposes of diagnosis or
treatment. However, Wyoming courts have not demanded that the statements be made initially to a physician," or even that they be made during
the course of the examination itself.'5 In Stephens, the court indicated that
[a] statement need not be made to a physician, and statements made
to hospital attendants, or even family members, may be admitted
under rule 803(4) . .. [s]tatements made to close relatives, which

then are reported to the doctor, may be admitted under the rule, although double or multiple hearsay may be presented.6
Therefore, practitioners should be aware that statements made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment, whether made directly by the victim or relayed by another on the victim's behalf, may be admissible under the exception in 803(4).67 In satisfying the text of the rule itself, it is the purpose
motivating the statement, not who in fact relates the information that is important.
The second textual requirement of 803(4) is that the information must
be reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient." Courts
have interpreted this requirement as necessary for the admissibility of information concerning identity.9 Unless the statement facilitates the medical
procedure itself, any information received falls outside of 803(4).' Consequently, a physician asking and receiving questions outside of his/her pro-

63. Id.
64. United States v. NB, 59 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding no reversible error in the admission of statements made to a social worker); see United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1992)

(admitting statements made to a trained social worker); United State v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206 (7th Cir.
1992) (ruling that psychology is medical for purposes of the rules); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 803(4) (1996); DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 444 (1980).

65. Stephens, 774 P.2d at 73. See also State v. Brubaker, 602 P.2d 974, 980 (Mont 1979) (demonstrating that double hearsay does not necessarily disqualify testimony from the hearsay exception);
Gordon v. Engineering Constr. Co., 135 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Minn. 1965) (allowing testimony as to a

medical opinion predicated on information received from a third person).
66. Stephens., 774 P.2d at 73.
67. Id.
69. Wyo. R. EVID. 803(4). David W. Louisell and Christopher Mueller demonstrate the potential for
some ambiguity in the pertinency standard. Theoretically, to ensure trustworthiness, the pertinency of a
question must be realized by the declarant. That is, does the declarant believe that the question is pertinent to diagnosis and treatment. However, perhaps for practical reasons, the standard has been formulated into questioning whether the physician felt the question and answer pertinent, and then hoping that
the patient and the physician see eye to eye as to the impact of the statement. LOUiSELL & MUELLER,

supra note 64, § 444.
69. Stephens, 774 P.2d at 74.
70. Wyo. R. EVID. 803(4).
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fessional responsibility does not trigger the exception of rule 803(4)."
"[T]he simple fact that the statement was made to a doctor or other medical
personnel during treatment does not justify admission."'7
As in Blake, Wyoming practitioners most likely will be faced with a
court that places extreme importance on the application of the two-part test
in Renville." The Renville test has become the primary tool in 803(4) analysis in Wyoming, 4 and a practitioner faced with a medical diagnosis or
treatment exception question must be familiar with its application. Practitioners should note that for Renville test satisfaction, testimony of the medical examiner at trial must include statements that the hearsay testimony
given to him was consistent with the medical procedure, and that the medical examiner relied on this statement in diagnosis or treatment."
ANALYSIS

An individual, not called as a witness, identified David Blake as an
abuser.6 Wyoming courts have excused this fact by pointing to the purported reliability of statements allowed under 803(4). If reliability is indeed
the foundation for the exceptions to the hearsay rule, then the decisionmaking process on admissibility must be taken with great care.
Today medical examinations in purported sexual abuse cases are required by law." Therefore, when alleged physical injuries are slight or nonexistent, the potential for false allegations in the medical diagnosis or treat-

71. Id.
72. Stephens, 774 P.2d at 72. See also United States v. Longie, 984 F.2d 955, 959 (8th Cir. 1993)
(stating that the identity of the abuser is particularly important as it affects the physician's treatment and
reconmendation for counseling); State v. Wilson, 855 P.2d 657, 662 (Or. 1993). "The courts in this state
have recognized that identifying the abuser is crucial to appropriate treatment." Id. But see Jones v.
State, 606 So. 2d 1051, 1056-57 (Miss. 1992) (stating that statements as to identity were not admissible
because abuser was not a member of the immediate household and therefore question was not pertinent).
73. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text
74. Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474,478 (Wyo. 1997); Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 196 (Wyo. 1995);
Betzie v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Wyo. 1993); Stephens, 774 P.2d at 72-3.
75. Blake, 933 P.2d at 478.
76. Of course Blake could have called the victim to testify, but it must be remembered that one of
the constitutional hallmarks of our legal system is that in criminal cases the prosecution has the burden
of proof on every fact necessary to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). The overall importance of the general policy excluding hearsay has been described as follows:
[In hearsay testimony] the declarant does not testify under oath in the presence of the fact
finder, he or she is unburdened by the solemnity of the trial and the possibility of public
disgrace, thereby escaping the influence of these factors and their accompanying effects on
witnesses' veracity. Under our legal system, the trier of fact is entrusted with the task of
evaluating the perception, memory, narration, and sincerity of witnesses; assessing these traits
is more difficult to do with hearsay because the trier of fact cannot observe the demeanor of
the witnesses. Hearsay is not subject to cross-examination, which is believed to be vital in
exposing imperfections in a witness's account
Marks, supra note 20, at 216.
77. WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 6-2-309(a) (Michie 1997).
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ment process is arguably the same as in the criminal accusation process. '
Nevertheless, the textual requirements of the rule may still offer sufficient
guarantees of reliability. However, the rule must be properly applied. In this
regard, the text of 803(4) demands that both proper motivation and pertinency to diagnosis be present."
Three reasons counsel trial judges to take great care in ensuring proper
803(4) applicability. First, the rule itself demands that the statement be
made for "purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment."' " This text requires
78. As is the case in many sexual assaults, physical evidence of the alleged assault is often nonexistentor limited. Only a small percentage of child sexual abuse cases produce medical evidence. John E. B.
Meyers et al., Expert Testimony in Child SexualAbuse Litigation, 68 NEaB.
L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1989). A
lack of medical evidence is not and should not be a conclusive ban on prosecution and conviction in all
cases. However, this undercuts the "selfish motivation" idea behind statements given during a mandatory
examination (an examination that may or may not discover physical evidence of injury, that may or may
not be determinative of a decision to prosecute). A false accusation followed by an examination that
reveals no injury does little to motivate an individual accuser to tell the truth, yet this testimony ultimately is indistinguishable, when introduced through hearsay statements, from the majority of valid
sexual abuse accusations who also display no physical injury.
79. The "reasonably pertinent" requirement is arguably the most difficult aspect of the rule for the
judicial process to deal with. Decisions as to what is, and what is not, reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment is outside the expertise of most judges. The universal loophole into admissibility is for the
examining physician to testify that the identity of the perpetrator was used as a means to determine the
parameters of the examination. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980). If courts
are unwilling to make the distinction between the doctor having to know the relationship of the victim to
the assailant and the doctor having to know the name of the assailant, then perhaps this note would best
be directed to advocating a change in the language of 803(4) itself. This distinction may be of extreme
importance because not all perpetrators are identifiable by their relationship to the victim, and arguably
the actual name of the abuser is in most instances not pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment. Along
these lines it could possibly be argued that UnitedStates v.Renville stands for the basic principal that the
admission of hearsay identity statements is limited to family sexual abuse cases. See United States v.
Renville, 779 Fld 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 608 (8th Cir.
1987); Jones v. State, 606 So. 2d 1051, 1056-57 (Miss. 1992). In farnily sexual abuse cases the value of
identity statements is obvious, the potential for harm is unquestionable if the victim is returned to the
home of an abuser. Renville, 779 F.2d at 438.
80. WYo. R. EVID. 803(4). Of course, the argument could be made that even if improperly motivated
the statement could still be for the "purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment" This argument is similar
to objections raised concerning medical examinations conducted solely for preparation for trial, or for
reasons other than simply for treatment. See Mosteller, supra note 53, at 261-64 (arguing that the exception should not be extended when exam is purely diagnostic); see also Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83
(insisting that the physician who examined the victim was attempting to solve a crime rather than treat or
diagnose a patient); Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Ky. 1993) (ruling that a physician
consulted for purposes other than treatment has less inherent reliability); Felix v. State, 849 P.2d 220,
225 (Nev. 1993) (ruling that statements were inadmissible because the physician was paid by the state
and acting more as an investigator than as a treating doctor); State v. Stafford, 346 S.E.2d 463, 466-68
(N.C. 1986) (holding that the statement identifying the assailant was inadmissible when made to a doctor
who was consulted for the purposes of preparing prosecution's case). But see FED. R. EVID. 803(4)
advisory committee's note: "Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not
within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only for the purposes of enabling
him to testify .... The [Federal Rules of Evidence] reject [this] limitation." FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note. The case law tends to vindicate this approach. United States v. Whitehead, 994
F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1993) (admitting the statement despite the fact that the doctor was helping the prosecution); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (allowing hearsay statements in a
diagnosis-only examination, despite acknowledging that often diagnosis-only examinations are performed solely to prepare for testimony at trial); O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.
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an inquiry into motivation, a process uniquely applicable to the legal process. Medical doctors are not bound by the text of 803(4) and their emphasis
is rightly on treatment and not on the patient's potential accusatory motivation in making the statement.
Second, the judge is faced with the necessity of balancing the unfair
prejudicial effect of evidence against its probative value." The testimony of
a doctor concerning his or her reliance on a statement of identity loses much
of its probative value when the motivation behind the statement is questionedm Statements made by a victim in the context of a medical exam,
motivated by malice or revenge, have little if any probative value in correctly convicting a sexual abuser. This concern is beyond relevance to a
physician faced with an injured patient; for medical personnel, diagnosis
and treatment take precedence, and to be done properly a physician must
take into consideration the statements of the patient as to the cause of her
injuries.
Third, due to the discretionary nature of evidence admissibility decisions, appellate courts, faced with a completed trial record, can play only a
limited role in ensuring the proper application of the rule." Therefore, for a
reasonable chance at the correct application of 803(4), the trial judge must
make a correct, accurate decision in the first instance.
One problem with the proper application of 803(4) is that the rule necessarily combines the expertise of the medical and legal professions. Of
course, most lawyers are not doctors, and consequently, a judge when faced
with testimony that a trained medical expert relied upon particular information is apt to take it at face value and find the criteria of 803(4) met." However, medical doctors, faced with a possible abuse situation, are not concerned with the subtleties of the rules of evidence, but rather with proper
diagnosis and treatment.
Does 803(4) demand that doctors share an understanding of the potential pitfalls of hearsay testimony? Absolutely not, the rule itself is premised
on the idea that information found by a doctor to be sufficiently trustworthy

1978); See also Wooldridge v. Brown, 816 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1987).
81. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 952 (4th Cir. 1988); Wyoming Rule of Evidence 403 reads:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice ..."Wyo. R. EVID. 403.
82. Morgan,846 F.2d at 951-52 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
83. Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474,478-79 (Wyo. 1997).
84. Id. at 477; Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 956 (Wyo. 1996); Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233
(Wyo. 1986).
85. Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 726 (Wyo. 1983) (recognizing the necessity ofjudicial reliance
on the views of medical personnel as to what facts are pertinent to diagnosis and treatment).
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on which to base medical procedures, is also reliable enough to escape hearsay proscription." In most cases the distinct goals of the medical process
(correct treatment for an injured patient)2' and of the legal process (sufficient
reliability to ensure due process for the defendant) u yield a common result
(sufficient trustworthiness)," but this is not always the case.
The Blake court's discussion of age illustrates the need for close judicial scrutiny of 803(4) admissibility decisions. The age of the victim, while
not dispositive, and not a requirement of the exception itself, may be an
indication of a motivation other than that demanded by the text of 803(4).
Questions concerning age, and a determination of how age affects the patient's "selfish motivation" have been a factor in much of the case law concerning 803(4). In Renville, the court indicated that the young age of the
victim mitigated against any skepticism concerning the motive of the statement.m Presumably, this assertion is based on the idea that a child is willing
to believe that during medical treatment, anything less than the truth could
have harmful consequences.
The opinion of Justice Powell in the Fourth Circuit case Morgan v.
Foretich demonstrates the potential correlation of age to the motivation and
inherent reliability of the hearsay statement.9' In Morgan, Powell indicated
there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that the four-year-old
victim approached a question as to her assailant's identity in the frame of
mind of the patient seeking treatment.Y Powell found this important in his
decision that the "motivation" prong of the Renville test had not been met,
and consequently that the inherent reliability of the statement had decreased
to a level inconsistent with the goals underlying the exception itself.3
In cases similar to Blake, the declarant's naivete is not in question, but
rather the potential for a seventeen-year-old to realize that untruthful statements given during a mandatory exam can be offered with no negative
physical repercussions. If this occurs, the "selfish interest" motive has again
86. Id.
87. Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Wyo. 1993).
88. Goldade, 674 P.2d at 726.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 441 (8th Cir. 1985); Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200,
205 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Nick,
604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979).
91. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
92. Id. at 952.
93. Id. This reasoning is not without support in Wyoming courts. A concurring opinion in Montoya
v. State indicated the potential for motivation to reduce the inherent reliability of a statement below that
required by 803(4). Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 368-69 (Wyo. 1991); see also Cassidy v. State, 536
A.2d 666, 679-80 (Md. App. 1988) (agreeing with testimony that a two-year-old victim could not formulate the necessary correlation between correct answers and correct treatment, and ruling that therefore
the statements were inadmissible).
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disappeared, and damaging hearsay statements are put before a jury.
The Blake court dismissed the question of age simply by insisting that
age goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility." However, the potential correlation between age and motive is an issue the text of
803(4) demands the judge address before it reaches the jury. Hearsay identity statements are admissible only when a judge, working within the confines of the rules of evidence, finds the textual criteria of 803(4) met." A
judge, as the caretaker of the legal system, has a duty to apply the rules of
evidence as a whole and as a system. Juries, on the other hand, are much
more concerned with determining the facts of that particular case, and less
with the societal values embodied in the rules of evidence.96 As a consequence of the potential divergence between medical and legal processes,
appellate courts should demand that a detailed inspection of all 803(4) evidence take place before the testimony is submitted to the jury.
Arguably, factors to be explored by the trial judge, before the evidence
is submitted to the jury, include: the age of the victim, the nature of the
doctor/patient relationship; the passage of time between the assault and the
diagnosis or treatment; the relationship between the victim and the assailant;
and subsequent statements by the victim.
What is urged here is caution, and an effort on behalf of the trial process to ensure that the requirements of 803(4) are met whenever it is invoked
as an exception to the general hearsay rule. Blake should not be viewed as a
green light for cases where the reliability of identity statements is taken for
granted at the trial level, and then accepted without serious judicial challenge at the appellate level." The severity of the stakes demand that this
does not happen.
CONCLUSION

The courts of Wyoming, its legislature, and its citizens, presumably
support not only the hearsay rule, but also its exceptions. This note is not
meant to advocate the discarding of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803(4), nor
to suggest that identity statements should never be admitted as part of the
exception, but rather to insist that today's jurisprudence evaluate the applicability of the rule to each particular individual confronted by it. This focus
will hopefully lend support to the idea that for hearsay statements as poten94. Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474,479 (Wyo. 1997).
95. Wyo. R. EVID. 104 reads: "Preliminary questions concerning the ... admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court ......
96. John Kaplan, Of Marbus and Zorgs-An Esay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 CAL. L. REV.
987,990 (1978).
97. See Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 728 (Wyo. 1983) (Brown, J., dissenting).
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tially damaging as those concerning identity, each statement must be examined and evaluated individually in order to ensure the inherent reliability
that the Wyoming Rules of Evidence and liberty demand.
JEFF OVEN
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